Título:	Ensaios em economia da infraestrutura
Autor(es):	Neves, Carlos Eduardo Veras
Orientador(es):	Bertussi, Geovana Lorena
Assunto:	Empréstimo bancário Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Brasil) Modelos autorregressivos Benchmarking Análise envoltória de dados Análise de Fronteira Estocástica de Produção (SFA) Modelos econométricos Infraestrutura (Economia) Empréstimo bancário
Data de publicação:	24-Nov-2021
Data de defesa:	13-Set-2021
Referência:	NEVES, Carlos Eduardo Veras. Ensaios em economia da infraestrutura. 2021. 201 f., il. Tese (Doutorado em Economia)—Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2021.
Abstract:	This thesis is composed by a set of three essays on Infrastructure Economics. In the first, we investigate the impact of subsidized loans from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) on aggregate investment in Brazil between November 2002 and Decem ber 2019. For such analysis, we built Autoregressive Lag Models Distributed (ARDL) and Bayesian Hierarchical Vector Autoregressive Models (BVAR), considering BNDES disbursements both at an aggregate level, and at a disaggregated level by economic sector. We take as reference the work of BARBOZA; VASCONCELOS(2019) for choosing model variables and it’s construction. The ARDL’s and BVAR’s models results suggest that the BNDES’ disbursement policy did not contribute in a relevant and statistically significant way to the increase of country’s aggregate investment. These observations are in accordance with the collated literature, and they meet empirical evidences at both microeconometric and macroeconometric levels. Furthermore, there are evidences that points towards that the BNDES’ subsidized loan policy may also have, among ther factors, contributed to the degradation of country’s economic fundamentals tha are necessary to make good use of international positive shocks, such as the commodities’ supercycle that ended in 2015. Therefore, this first article is an original contribution to the literature about the effects of loans carried out by BNDES, as it covers the period between 2002 and 2019, in addition of making use of ARDL and BVAR techniques for modeling the studied phenomenon. BNDES was the main financier of large infrastructure projects carried out in the period between 2002 and 2019, constituting a prerequisite for the achievement of various concession projects. So,in this second essay, we investigate ways to quantitatively assess the performance of brazilian federal highway concessionaires. For that, we apply benchmarking techniques, based on national and international experiences in infrastructure regulation (transporta tion and energy distribution markets). The database consists of twenty-one federal highway concession contracts, covering the first three stages of the federal concession program, from 2012 to 2016. We apply several models: DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), SFA (Stochas tic Frontier Analysis), and the model named StoNED (Stochastic Semi-Nonparametric Envelopment of Data). The last was recently developed by KUOSMANEN; JOHNSON; SAASTAMOINEN(2015), and has been applied since 2012 by the Regulatory Authority for the Energy Market of Finland (Energiamarkkinavirasto - EMV). In general, it is possible to note that the benchmarking analysis results are robust, since, on average, they converge to a similar level, and their correlation coeficientes are high and statistically significant. On average, the efficiencies calculated were: in DEA-type models 92%; in SFA-type models 82%; and in StoNED-type models 92.5%. The results are consistent with the literature. Among the three concession stages, although the differences are not statistically significant, we can observe that the 3rd-stage concessions are those which have the worst relative performance according to the SFA models. Thus, the proposed benchmarking model, together with the application of the various methods to obtain the efficiency scores, constitute a suitable framework for the implementation of a incentive regulation in the federal highway concession constracts. Besides the second article, we propose a methodology supported by the mentioned benchmarking techniques to estimate the X-Factor, which is an essential component of price-cap regulation. The price-cap regulation is - at least in theory - adopted in the federal highway concession contracts. In 2012, the X-Factor was introduced in the tariff equation of concession contracts, to promote and share productivity gains with the infrastrutcture users. The regulatory authority, however, did not established how the X-Factor should be calculated. Further, in 2019, it was excluded from the tariff‘s equation of all contracts, as we can see in the Southern Integration Highway contract, signed in 2019. We conducted a literature review, which highlights the importance of an incentive-oriented regulation, and we also review the international experiences. We also show that the highway contracts outputs are widely criticized by the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), which points out that, among other factors, the existence of an inadequate incentive structure in contracts, followed by a regulation that does not push towards better results, is responsible for the high rates of defaults and renegotiations identified in these contracts. From the results of DEA, SFA and StoNED analysis, we propose a methodology to set tariffs including the X-Factor. The results obtained show that the X-Factor, considering a five-year regulation cycle, and an exponential decay rule for the annual application of a discount factor, it represents, at least a 3.5% discount on the tariffs of twenty-one highway contracts in regulatory-cycle‘s first year. Therefore, our proposal represents an advance in the national literature, and has the potential to be a regulatory foccused on stimulating the efficiency of highway concessionaires. The X-Factor obtained are numerically relevant, and the methodology is flexible to allow it‘s calibration accordingly to regulators and regulated market needs. At last, this thesis brings other evidences that can contribute to the debate about our regulatory institutional environment: the absence of competition and innovation induces the rent-seeking and opportunistic behavior of economic agents. There is an urge to develop the institutional framework for financing and regulation, especially on large infrastructure projects. It plays an important role in the sustained economic growth and society welfare.
Unidade Acadêmica:	Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Gestão de Políticas Públicas (FACE) Departamento de Economia (FACE ECO)
Informações adicionais:	Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Administração, Contabilidade, Economia e Gestão de Políticas Públicas, Departamento de Economia, Brasília, 2021.
Programa de pós-graduação:	Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia
Licença:	A concessão da licença deste item refere-se ao termo de autorização impresso assinado pelo autor com as seguintes condições: Na qualidade de titular dos direitos de autor da publicação, autorizo a Universidade de Brasília e o IBICT a disponibilizar por meio dos sites www.bce.unb.br, www.ibict.br, http://hercules.vtls.com/cgi-bin/ndltd/chameleon?lng=pt&skin=ndltd sem ressarcimento dos direitos autorais, de acordo com a Lei nº 9610/98, o texto integral da obra disponibilizada, conforme permissões assinaladas, para fins de leitura, impressão e/ou download, a título de divulgação da produção científica brasileira, a partir desta data.
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